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NOTE
THE PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2005: WHO
SHOULD PAY FOR IMPROVED
OUTCOMES?
Robert A. Kerrt
INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Medicine's report "To Err is Human"' has been
cited hundreds, if not thousands, of times since its release in 1999. In
this report, it was estimated that perhaps as many as 98,000 people die
each year in America due to medical error. 2 The report made a num-
ber of recommendations that the Institute of Medicine (IOM) hoped
would address these errors.3 While some specialties of medicine, such
as anesthesiology,4 have been successful at reducing the medical er-
rors associated with their practice of medicine, there has not been any
systematic overhaul of the delivery of health care or the remaining
specialties of medicine to effectuate changes that would address the
medical errors that result in so many deaths.
Among the report's recommendations, which were based on the
aviation industry, was one to increase the level of medical safety re-
search; 5 another was to increase medical error reporting through a
I J.D. candidate 2007, St. Thomas University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Pendo for her guidance while writing this
paper.
1 To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et
al. eds., 2000).
2 Id. at 26.
3 Id. at 5-14.
4 Mortality rates due to surgical anesthesia dropped from 1 in 852 to I in
6,048 administrations in the 1950s and 1960s to between 1 in 2,000 and 1 in 10,000 in
the 1970s and 1980s and to 1 in 200,000 today. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver,
The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of
the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 918 (2005).
5 Thomas R. McLean, The Implications of Patient Safety Research & Risk
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system that would neither blame nor punish providers.6 A system of
reporting analogous to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)7
was suggested by the IOM 8 and has also been suggested by other
scholars. 9 This proposed system was designed ideally to encourage
reporting so that institutional-not individual-problems could be
alleviated. Because doctors, nurses, and other health care providers
are human, accidents will happen. 1° It is hoped that identifying errors
in the processes associated with health care delivery would result in
much fewer patient injuries than result from the current system. How-
ever, such a system would likely be prohibitively expensive, with
some estimating such a system to cost $350 million per year.
Medication errors are a large percentage of medical errors.
2
While it is difficult to provide an accurate count, deaths from medica-
tion errors have been estimated at seven thousand per year.13 Another
study published in the Journal of the American Pharmaceutical Asso-
ciation estimated that patient deaths by drug misuse were 218,000 in
2000.14 The injuries and mortalities associated with medication error
are accompanied by yearly medical costs of an estimated $37.6 bil-
lion, approximately $17 billion of which is associated with prevent-
able error.' 5 While 7,000 deaths may not rival the number of people
Managed Care, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 227,244 (2002).
6 id.
7 To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 1, at 71-72. Following World War II, mili-
tary leaders realized that planning for safety was as important as planning the mission
in terms of safety. As a result, today, "civilian aviation takes a comprehensive ap-
proach to safety, with programs aimed at setting and enforcing standards, accident
investigation, incident reporting, and research for continuous improvement." Id. at 72.
8 McLean, supra note 5, at 246.
9 See, e.g., Bryan J. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing
Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physician, and Attor-
ney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541,561-562 (2000).
10 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 948.
11 Id. at 988. See also McLean, supra note 5, at 248.
12 Peter A. Clark, Medication Errors in Family Practice, in Hospitals and
After Discharge from the Hospital: An Ethical Analysis, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 349,
350-51 (2004) ("[M]edication errors are one of the primary concerns. The principal
causes of medication errors include prescribing the wrong type of drug, ordering an
improper dose, giving a patient a drug that he or she is allergic to, or combining
medications that are incompatible.").
13 Id. at 349.
14 Third in Series on Medicare Reform: Laying the Groundwork for a Rx
Drug Benefit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 107th Cong. 61 (2001) (statement of Michael R. Cohen, President, Institute
for Safe Medication Practices).
15 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. AHRQ 00-P037, MEDICAL ERRORS: THE SCOPE OF
THE PROBLEM, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/errback.htm.
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killed by handguns every year,' 6 and while these deaths comprise a
relatively small percentage of deaths resulting from medical error,
these 7,000 deaths and other, unrecorded injuries are clearly accom-
panied by enormous cost. More importantly, many of these medica-
tion errors, along with other medical errors, likely can be eliminated.
On July 29, 2005, Congress passed the The Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Act). 17 This Act, established after
several years of debate in Congress, creates Patient Safety Organiza-
tions (PSOs) that will analyze data collected by hospitals and provid-
ers in the hopes that doing so would help to identify problems with the
process of the delivery of health care.' 8 These PSOs would collect the
data in accordance with other applicable regulations, including the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),' 9 and
examine it to identify ways to prevent future injury.20
Beyond the obvious problems with the PSOs' requirement of ana-
lyzing data, such as data standardization for comparison across pro-
viders, practice areas, or both, and how to identify problem areas and
near misses, the Act fails to provide funding for PSOs to carry out this
work. The Act provides no funding for the establishment or mainte-
nance of these organizations, and precludes one very prominent player
in health care-health insurers-from funding PSOs. 21 Without a
government mandate to pay for the reporting and analysis of this data,
there appears to be no incentive or funding to do so; creation of stan-
dards for PSOs will not necessarily result in creation of PSOs, without
which the goals of the Act cannot be met. Funding should, therefore,
be sought in order to accomplish the purposes of the Act.
A funding option for PSOs does exist. Pharmaceutical companies
are in a unique position to step in and provide funding for PSOs. They
have the resources-financial and technical-to gather and analyze
16 The National Center for Health Statistics reported that in 2002 11,829
people were killed by the intentional discharge of firearms. Kenneth D. Kochanek et
al., 53 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 14, 2004, at 32.
17 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41,
119 Stat. 424 (2005).
'8 Id. at § 923.
19 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. HIPAA regulates health plans, health care clearinghouses,
and health care providers who transmit health information electronically. Since most
health insurers require electronic transmittal of billing information, this law applies to
nearly every health care provider. HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of protected health
information, meaning individually identifiable health information that is transmitted
or maintained electronically or in any other medium.
20 Cf Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act § 923(c).
21 Id. at § 924(b)(l)(D).
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the data collected. Pharmaceutical company participation can serve its
own interests while achieving the goals advanced by the PSO legisla-
tion. It appears to be the best, if not only, solution to accomplishing
the purposes of the Act, considering the state of the health care system
in the United States.
Part I of this paper examines the unique and central role pharma-
ceutical companies play in the U.S. health care system. Pharmaceuti-
cal companies rely on the health care system to be profitable. In par-
ticular, they rely on the willingness of sick people to test unproven
drugs that are likely to have unknown and/or severe side effects.
While these patients might benefit from participating in a clinical trial
to determine the safety and efficacy profile of a drug, the pharmaceu-
tical companies are motivated by tremendous financial incentives.
Part II looks at the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005 (Act) and the opportunity it will afford the health care commu-
nity to improve the quality of care it provides. The Act provides non-
financial incentives to the health care industry by removing the stigma
and fear possibly associated with reporting data. As part of this Act,
Congress has mandated the creation of PSOs to collect and analyze
the data. However, it has failed to provide funding for these organiza-
tions, leaving one to wonder how the government intends to accom-
plish the analyses and subsequent improvement in quality of care and
patient safety.
Part I provides the rationale for expecting and looking to phar-
maceutical companies to provide the funding for PSOs. As outlined in
Part I, pharmaceutical companies rely on the health care industry to
make money. However, their mere involvement in the industry results
in a significant amount of medical error and associated cost. Pharma-
ceutical companies ought to have an interest in seeing medical errors
caused by their products reduced. Not only does medical error cause
morbidity and mortality in the patients pharmaceutical companies
purport to help, these companies create an increased burden on the
health care system by increasing costs because of the adverse events
caused by their products. However, there are disincentives for phar-
maceutical companies to improve patient safety and quality of care,
such as decreased utilization of their products as a result of proper use
of their drugs and decreased need for their drugs resulting from treat-
ing fewer adverse events.
Lastly, Part IV looks at the other participants in the health care
system and argues that they are not in a position to fund PSOs. Con-
sumers, providers, health insurers, employers, and the government all
interact with and affect the utilization of health care in the U.S. Each
has a vested interest in seeing improvements in patient safety and
quality of care. Each, however, is limited-or has chosen to limit their
[Vol. 17:319
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participation, in the case of the government-in their ability to pay for
PSOs. Given the inability of entities in the health care system other
than pharmaceutical companies to pay for PSOs, one possible source
of funding remains: large pharmaceutical companies.
I. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES PLAY A
CRITICAL ROLE IN HEALTHCARE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers have been
22around for over a century. Their prominence in the health care field
has arguably never been greater. Americans spend upwards of $200
billion on prescription drugs a year,23 constituting almost 13 percent
of the $1.6 trillion Americans spent on health care in 2002.24 This
$200 billion is only what Americans spend on health care in a year as
individual consumers-it does not take into account drugs paid for by
insurance companies or dispensed in doctors' offices or hospitals.25
This staggering amount is even more awe-inspiring in light of IMS
Health's 26 estimation that the total worldwide sales of drugs in 2002
were $400 billion.27
Not only are pharmaceuticals increasing in price, they are the
fastest growing part of the health care tab.28 Drug spending between
1993 and 1996 experienced an average of 10.9 percent growth over
that period.29 The reasons for this are two-fold: first, people are taking
more drugs, and, second, the drugs they are taking are more likely to
be brand-name pharmaceuticals as opposed to the generic brands.3°
Take, for example, Claritin and Clarinex.
Claritin, the brand name of the drug loratadine, was a blockbuster
allergy drug for Schering-Plough, scheduled to go off patent in
2002.31 This loss of patent meant that Schering-Plough would lose
drug exclusivity-meaning that it was no longer the only company
22 See, e.g., About Merck, Merck & Co., Inc., http://www.merck.com/about/
("Established in 1891, Merck discovers, develops, manufactures and markets vaccines
and medicines to address unmet medical needs.").
23 MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES 3 (2004).
24 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 497 (5th ed. 2004).
25 ANGELL, supra note 23, at 4-5.
26 IMS Health is a leading source of pharmaceutical statistics. See id. at 5.
27 Id.
28 Id. at xii.
29 Sheila Smith et al., The Next Decade of Health Spending: A New Outlook,
HEALTH Anr., July - Aug. 1999, at 86, 91.
30 ANGELL, supra note 23, at xii.
31 Id. at 79.
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that could sell loratadine-that generated $2.7 billion in sales in
2001 .32 As Claritin approached the end of its patent, Schering-Plough
launched a large campaign to switch users of Claritin to Clarinex,
which contained the Claritin metabolite, instead of the Claritin drug.
33
Roughly speaking, this means that the body is getting, in Clarinex, the
same drug the body converts Claritin to after ingestion. There is no
difference between the two drugs. 34 Schering-Plough patented
Clarinex, priced it lower than the still-protected Claritin (but higher
than the soon-to-be generic-priced Claritin), and urged doctors to
switch their patients from Claritin to Clarinex. 35 This resulted in al-
lowing Schering-Plough to keep some of its exclusivity and revenues
originally generated by Claritin by switching prescriptions and pre-
venting people from continuing to take loratadine with the generic
version of Claritin.
While drugs are becoming more expensive, pharmaceutical com-
panies are bringing in ever-increasing amounts of money. In 2002,
combined profits for the ten pharmaceutical companies in the Fortune
500 were $35.9 billion.36 By comparison, the other 490 companies in
the Fortune 500 had a combined profit of $33.7 billion.37 At the same
time that pharmaceutical companies have been bringing in disgust-
ingly large profits, they have been spending more on marketing than
on research and development.38 While spending more on marketing
and advertising than on research and development, they have cried out
against price controls in the United States, arguing that the high cost
of pharmaceuticals is justified by the cost to develop and bring to
market new drugs.39 Some sources have calculated that it may cost as
much as $802 million to bring a new drug to market, while other cal-
culations indicate that it may be as little as a quarter of that.40 Explor-
ing these numbers on a larger scale shows that while pharmaceutical
companies may have spent $31 billion on research and development
in 2002, this was only 14 percent of their entire budget (and their prof-
its-35.9 billion-were more than they spent on research and devel-
opment).4 1 Even as these companies were spending $31 billion on
32 id.
33 id.
34 Id. at 80.
31 Id. at 79.
36 ANGELL, supra note 23, at 11.
37 id.
38 See id. at 11-12.
39 See generally id.
40 See id. at 37-51.
41 Id. at 11.
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research, they were pumping over twice that much into marketing and
administration ($67 billion).42 Along with these expenditures, phar-
maceutical companies make sure that they get the most they can out of
their representatives when they pass a major bill.43
In fact, big pharmaceutical companies are by themselves bringing
few totally new drugs, meaning drugs that are not derivatives of exist-
ing medicines, to market in a given year and even fewer new useful
drugs. As an example, seventeen new active ingredients were among
the seventy-eight drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) in 2002. Of these seventeen, the FDA rated only seven
of these drugs as improvements over medicines already on the mar-
ket.4
5
Based on this very cursory snapshot of the pharmaceutical indus-
try today, it could be very convincingly argued that pharmaceutical
companies have money to spare. In fact, they have a lot of money to
spare, as evidenced by the amount of money these companies spend
on sales and marketing. 46 They could reallocate some of their market-
ing and advertising dollars to help fund PSOs, improving patient
safety and quality instead of inundating the public with fancy televi-
sion ads.
A. Pharmaceutical Companies Rely on Patient and Provider Partici-
pation in Clinical Trials to Make Advancements in Pharmaceuticals
Part of the money pharmaceutical companies do spend on re-
search and development is spent on clinical trials.47 This money goes
to a variety of tasks that include: discovering the drug, isolating it, and
then making it; providing study supplies; recruiting physicians to par-
ticipate in the trial, who in turn find the patient volunteers; and col-
lecting the data, analyzing the data, and reporting it to the FDA so that
it can progress from Phase I (initial testing in humans) through to
42 Id. at 48.
43 Senator Durbin of Illinois noted, "[W]e have learned time and again - that
hardly any major bill could go through the Senate unless it figured out a way to help
drug companies." 149 CONG. REc. S8871, 8881 (daily ed. July 7, 2003). See also
ANGELL, supra note 23, at 193-216.
44 ANGELL, supra note 23, at 16.
41 Id. at 16-17.
46 As an observation, 1 percent of the 2002 profit of Fortune 500 pharmaceu-
tical companies - approximately $350 million - would be sufficient to fund the avia-
tion-style reporting system thought by some scholars to be prohibitively expensive.
See Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 988; McLean, supra note 5, at 248.
47 ClinicalTrials.gov, An Introduction to Clinical Trials, http://www.clinical
trials.gov/ct/info/whatis/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
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Phase III (final testing in humans) and beyond (Phase IV - post mar-
ket-approval studies).48
These studies involve hundreds of people who play roles of vary-
ing sizes in drug development. These roles include doctors and nurses,
of course, but also the patients themselves, clinical data managers to
process the collected data, scientists who develop and test the drug in
its initial phases, biostatisticians, computer programmers, and other
facilitators that enable the process to run as smoothly as possible.
While these people play only a relatively small role within the scope
of their participation in the life of a developed drug, without them
pharmaceutical testing and development would grind to a halt. No
new drugs would be isolated or developed. No new pills or incredibly
toxic cancer drug would be prepared and dispensed by the pharmacist.
No data would be collected and spit out in ready-to-analyze electronic
formats. No biostatisticians would generate tables and graphs in an
easy-to-read format outlining the successes and failures of a clinical
trial. Pharmaceutical companies depend on these people-particularly
patients-to help guide their drugs from discovery through to eventual
FDA approval.
B. Contract Research Organizations (CROs) Perform Critical Func-
tions as Part of a Clinical Trial
Increasingly, these middlemen, i.e., people who are not the drug
developers and who are not the health care providers, actually over-
seeing administration of a new drug, come from contract research
organizations (CROs).49 CROs are often contracted, as the name
suggests, to provide support services for a pharmaceutical company
during the clinical trial process. 50 These services can even include
formulating and packaging the drug during the testing phases. 5' How-
ever, for the purposes of this Act, there is one area of expertise that is
particularly important: data collection and analysis.
48 ClinicalTrials.gov, An Introduction to Clinical Trials, http://www.clinical
trials.gov/ct/info/whatis/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
49 Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for Human Subjects, 27 AM.
J.L. & MED. 253 (2001); see also Jonathan M. Fishbein et al., Domestic and Multina-
tional Clinical Trials: Issues in Design, Implementation, and Management for Bio-
technology Research and Product Development, 1 J. BIOLAw & Bus. 6, 13-16 (1998).
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Services, Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc., http://
www.ppdi.com/services/home.htm.
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The largest CROs, Covance, Quintiles, Parexel, and PPD,52 all
provide data collection and analysis for their pharmaceutical clients.53
As drugs pass through the clinical trial process, data regarding their
safety and efficacy must be gathered to support an application to the
FDA, because it is only through FDA approval that a company can
capitalize on the new drug. CROs provide the staff to appropriately
collect, store, question, report, and analyze that data to provide justifi-
cation for FDA aplroval to market a drug. Pharmaceutical companies
have leaned on outsourcing to these CROs to make them more effi-
cient; as large companies with billions to spend on research, they can
demand more of the CROs than they could of their own employees
because the CROs depend on contracts from the pharmaceutical com-
panies to pay their employees.
II. THE PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2005
The Act was the result of several years' work by Congress to pass
a bill to improve patient safety.54 Along the way, the bill received
bipartisan support each year it was presented to Congress but was
finally passed in 2005 without providing funding to PSOs. 55 At the
same time, Congress mandated that individual identifiers be removed
from the data,56 presumably in an effort to encourage reporting of
medical errors without fear of reprisal. In establishing PSOs, Congress
appears to have recognized the potential for plaintiffs' lawyers to
abuse the existence of data collected by PSOs and exempted this data
from discovery.
52 See Kimberly Sentek, Report on Contract Research Organizations: The
Turnaround, MED. AD NEWS, Oct. 2002, at 14, 14 (stating these four CROs had com-
bined revenues of nearly $2.5 billion in 2001).
53 See Clinical Services: Systems & Technology, Covance Inc.,
http://www.covance.com/clinicallsystems.php (last visited May 10, 2007); Data Man-
agement, Quintiles Transnational Corp., http://www.quintiles.com/ServicesSolutions/
ClinicalTrials/DataManagement/Overview.htm (last visited May 10, 2007); Clinical
Research Services - Clinical Trials, PAREXEL Int'l, http://www.parexel.com/
clinicalresearch/clinical trials.asp (last visited May 10, 2007); Data Management,
Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc., http://www.ppdi.com/services/phase-ii
_iiib/data management/home.htm (last visited May 10, 2007).
5T See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, S. 2590, 107th Cong. § 2
(2002); Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, S. 720, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003).
55 See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub L. No.
109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005). No provision for funding of this Congressional mandate
is made in this bill.
56 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2007).
HEALTH MATRIX
A. The Genesis of the Act
The debate over this law started in 199957 or 2000,58 and the bill
was first introduced as the Patient Safety and Errors Reduction Act5 9
in the 10 6th Congress by Senator Jeffords, an Independent from
Vermont. 6° At that time, the goal of the Act was to provide for the
improvement of patient safety and to reduce the incidence of events
that adversely affect patient safety and for other purposes.61 This bill,
ostensibly the same as the one that passed in 2005, however, failed to
pass both houses of Congress and languished until 2003.
In 2005, the bill was introduced again.62 Few changes had been
made to it. However, one of the notable developments surrounding the
bill in 2005 was that the money it was estimated to cost in its imple-
mentation had been reduced. The House version of the bill 63 in 2003
was estimated to increase discretionary spending by $104 million over
five years.64 This may have been the stumbling block that prevented
the two houses of Congress from coming to an agreement at that time.
While this bill died in Congress without being passed by both houses,
patients continued to die because of preventable medical error, even
though the cost of preventable medical errors is estimated between
$17 and $29 billion annually.65 When the bill finally did pass in 2005,
the committee report noted that the Act "would result in no new or
increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures
or revenues." 66 It did, however, estimate that it would cost $15 million
in 2006 and $70 million over 2006 to 2010 (mostly on the develop-
ment of the patient safety database), assuming necessary appropria-
tion,67 but specifically noted that "PSOs would not receive funding
under this bill."68
57 150 CONG. REc. S8617, 8631 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
58 See 151 CONG. REC. S8715, 8741 (daily ed. July 22, 2005); 151 CONG.
REc. H6673, 6676 (daily ed. July 27, 2005).
'9 S. 2738, 106th Cong. § 1 (2000).
60 150 CONG. REc. S8617, 8632 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
61 S. 2738, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000).
62 H.R. 3205, 109th Cong. (2005).
63 H.R. 663, 108th Cong. (2003).
64 S. REP. No. 108-196, at 16 (2003).
65 151 Cong. Rec. H6653, 6676 (daily ed. July 27, 2005).
66 H.R. REP. No. 109-197, at 10 (2005).
67 Id. at 12.
68 Id. It is unclear as to whether other specific legislation has failed in Con-
gress because of estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office. However,
the Congressional Budget Office's web site states:
CBO's cost estimates have become an integral part of the legislative proc-
ess, and committees increasingly refer to them at every stage of drafting
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B. Congress Chooses to Foster an Environment Conducive to Re-
ducing Medical Error
Finally, in 2005, Congress passed The Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005.69 The stated purpose of the Act is to "pro-
vide for the improvement of patient safety and to reduce the incidence
of events that adversely affect patient safety. ' 70 Among the law's fa-
cilitating provisions is one that allows for reporting data to PSOs
without fear of reprisal, i.e., lawsuits.71 The data reported to PSOs are
not subject to discovery in a medical malpractice hearing, and data
analyzed under the Act is not to be used to identify providers who
have committed medical errors.72 While the Act does not specifically
indicate the reason for this, it seems clear from the language of the
Act that this data was to be stripped of patient identifiers so that this
information could not be used against providers and so that providers
are encouraged to make available and seek analyses of their data.
Without the possibility that the data they provide to PSOs will be used
against them to show a pattern of poor outcomes, providers can now
provide this data and trust that it will be used only to effectuate the
goals of the Act: to improve patient safety by reducing adverse
effects.
C. The Act Creates Patient Safety Organizations to Facilitate Re-
duction of Medical Error
Most important in the context of this article is the definition of a
PSO. As defined in Section 921, a PSO "means a private or public
entity or component thereof that is listed by the Secretary [of Health
and Human Services] pursuant to section 924(d). 73 Section 924(d)
outlines that the Secretary shall maintain a listing of organizations that
are certified by the Secretary as meeting the criteria for certification
under the Act.74
bills. The estimates may also have an impact on the final outcome of legis-
lation because they are used to determine whether committees are comply-
ing with the annual budget resolutions and reconciliation instructions.
Congressional Budget Office, Background on Cost Estimates, http://www.cbo.gov/
CEBackground.shtml (last visited Sept, 6, 2006).
69 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-41,
119 Stat. 424 (2005).
70 Id. at 424.
"' Id. at § 922(e)(1).
72 Id. at § 922(a)(2).
71 Id. at § 921(4).
74 Id. at § 924(d).
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Specifically, to become a certified PSO under the Act, an entity
must: show that it "has policies and procedures in place to perform
each of the patient safety activities described in section 921(5)" ;75
show that its "mission and primary activity of the entity are to conduct
activities that are to improve patient safety and the quality of health
care delivery"; 76 have qualified staff, including licensed or certified
medical professionals either employed directly or by contract; 77 have
contracts of a reasonable time with more than one provider within 24
months of its initial certification; not be in whole or a part of a health
insurance issuer;78 disclose its financial, contractual, and reporting
relationships, including whether any providers have management or
control over the PSO; 79 collect patient safety data from providers in a
standard manner, as much as possible;80 and utilize the data provided
in order to provide "direct feedback and assistance ... to effectively
minimize patient risk.,
81
PSOs that are part of other organizations must meet additional cri-
teria, both upon initial and subsequent certification. As part of this
additional certification, these PSOs must make sure to maintain the
patient safety work product separately from the remainder of the com-
pany and have security measures to protect the patient confidentiality
82of the data, must not make unauthorized disclosure of patient safety
work product, which would thereby breach confidentiality,83 and must
not have a conflict of interest between its missions, as required by the
Act and the rest of the organization. 84
Of particular importance in relation to this article within this defi-
nition of a PSO are a number of caveats. One, the PSO cannot be, or
be a part of, a health insurer.85 Two, a PSO that is part of another
organization must maintain the patient safety work product separately
from the rest of the company and must not breach the confidential-
ity.86 Three, the work as a PSO must not have a conflict of interest
75 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-41,
§ 924(a)(1)(4), 119 Stat. 424, 433 (2005).
76 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(A).
77 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(B).
78 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(C)-(D).
'9 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(E)(i)-(ii).
80 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(F).
81 Id. at § 924(b)(1)(G).
82 Id. at § 924(b)(2)(A).
83 Id. at § 924(b)(2)(B).
84 ld. at § 924(b)(2)(C).
85 ld. at § 924(b)(1)(D).
86 Id. at § 924(b)(2)(A)-(B).
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within the organization. s7 These must be kept in mind when looking at
the organizations and industries involved in health care that might
want or be able to fund PSOs.
III. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES SHOULD
FUND PSOS
Drugs contribute to medical error in a number of ways. One of the
more common errors is dosing error, 8s meaning giving a patient too
much or too little of a prescribed drug. This is often caused by failing
to adjust drug dosage to account for a patient's impaired renal func-
tion, age, or size.89 Another common problem is prescribing patients
drugs that are contraindicated, resulting in injury or worsening of one
or more of a patient's conditions. 90 Moreover, in a Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) survey of
hospital CEOs, chief medical officers, and directors of patient care
services at 12 metropolitan hospitals, and employers, brokers, health
plans, and medical groups, the most frequently mentioned patient
safety activity was the improvement of drug safety. 9'
Pharmaceutical companies are in the best position, as will be out-
lined, to make use of the Act and provide funding for PSOs. They
have a vested interest, by virtue of the interactions with providers, in
providing quality care and have the contacts and funding to start, at
the very least, the process of analyzing data gathered from providers.
Part of this vested interest is the number of adverse drug events92 that
are the direct result of using the products these drug companies sell.
For instance, a 1998 study showed that 100,000 people died as a result
of a serious adverse drug reaction.93 This same study showed that
deaths from adverse drug reactions were the fourth leading cause of
death in the U.S.
94
As has been shown, big pharmaceutical companies have plenty of
money, especially in comparison to the other industries in the United
States who might be asked or who might have the interest to fund
87 Id. at § 924(b)(2)(C).
88 Clark, supra note 12.
89 Id. at 351.
90 Id. at 350.
91 Kelly J. Devers et al., What is Driving Hospitals' Patient-Safety Efforts?,
HEALTH AFF., Mar. - Apr. 2004, at 103, 107.
92 To ERR 1s HUMAN, supra note 1, at 28. This study defines adverse events
as "an injury caused by medical management rather than by the underlying condition
of the patient." Id.
93 Clark, supra note 12, at 351.
94 Id.
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PSOs. They have used their money to convince the American public
that the high prices they are paying for drugs is justified by the next
medical breakthrough that is right around the corner and that if they
lose funding-any funding-the public will not have the benefit of
revolutionary, live-saving medicines. They have done this while
spending more on convincing the public than actually performing the
research necessary to bring these breakthrough drugs to market.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies have provided campaign
funding and lobbied to have the government provide them with bene-
fits that have increased their profitability. 95 They continue to fight
against the reimportation of cheaper drugs from Canada, and Congress
passed Medicare Part D without any price controls usually available to
large managed care organizations.96 Their efforts, in turn, lead to in-
creased profits for the pharmaceutical companies.
It is only through true scientific analysis that cause and effect can
be established.97 Drug companies and CROs have the experience in
performing these analyses that would justify practice guidelines and
changing practice patterns to improve patient safety. As drug compa-
nies know, these kinds of analyses, like those done in clinical trials,
are costly.98 However, gathering the data and performing analyses on
them justifies reliance on that information, just as in a clinical trial. 99
Without doing a clinical trial-like analysis, the data may be considered
suspect and may instead just become a new marketing tool.10°
Beyond the benefits conferred upon them by the government that
ought to justify their paying for PSOs, i.e., preferential treatment as a
result of their lobbing efforts, they are in a unique position to do so.
Their relationships with CROs, organizations that are set up to
perform exactly what the Act requires of PSOs, would enable big
pharmaceutical companies to build funding of PSOs into their other
contracts with CROs. Alternatively, pharmaceutical companies could
provide funding to providers with whom they have clinical trial con-
95 For the 2002 federal elections, pharmaceutical companies gave over $29
million to federal office candidates. FURROW ET AL., supra note 24, at 507.96 Phuong Nguyen, A Review of Average Wholesale Price Litigation and
Comments on the Medicare Modernization Act, 9 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 249, 269
(2006).
97 McLean, supra note 5, at 253.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 253-54. Scientifically sound methodology for measuring errors
and their causes has been identified as essential to understanding the epidemiology of
patient safety. DONNA 0. FARLEY ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL PATIENT
SAFETY INMATE: CONTEXT AND BASELINE EVALUATION REPORT ONE 33 (2005) (the
report was sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality).
1oo Clark, supra note 12, at 354.
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tracts by stipulating that a certain amount of funding provided to a
physician is to be used for contracting with PSOs. At least one com-
pany, Pharmacia, has already taken steps to contribute to patient
safety, although it was done well before the Act was passed.'0 ' Hope-
fully, following passage of the Act, other companies will follow its
lead.
Another possible incentive for pharmaceutical companies to pay
for PSOs is the potential to find and subsequently reduce adverse
events on which the company previously had insufficient data. In the
wake of a Texas jury's award of $253 million for a Vioxx®-related
death, 0 2 drug companies might seek out PSOs as a way to provide
independent research to find side effects for which they might ulti-
mately be liable. Surely, within the 770,000 injuries and deaths each
year attributable to adverse drug events 0 3 or among the 51 million
prescriptions with errors or 3 million prescriptions with potentially
harmful errors,' °4 there are some that could have been prevented by
funding PSOs, and, by identifying them, they can take action to avoid
liability without identifying patients or providers.
Drug companies could also theoretically dovetail their funding of
PSOs to perform cost-effective analyses to help justify to providers
and health insurers the increased costs of their products. These analy-
ses could be done without identifying providers or patients, relying
only on the raw data on outcomes and drugs provided or procedures
performed.
However, these companies may have several disincentives for
doing so. Analyses may uncover overuse of drugs, consequently de-
creasing utilization and decreased profits. 05 Identifying medical
101 The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) announced in
January 2002 that it was partnering with Pharmacia "to develop a program to encour-
age medical groups to work together to deliver safer, more error-free health care in
the office setting by addressing systemic issues such as.. .medication errors...." Press
Release, National Committee for Quality Assurance, NCQA Partners with AMGA
and Pharmacia to Develop Patient Safety Program (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.ncqa.org/communications/news/amgaprogram.htm. This program was
slated to "provide $500,000 to fund and evaluate medical groups' safety and error
reduction initiatives, many of which are expected to become models for other organi-
zations." Id. On April 16, 2003, Pfizer began operating with Pharmacia as a unified
company under Pfizer. See Pfizer, Exploring Our History, http://www.pfizer.coml
pfizer/history/2000_present.jsp (last visited May 10, 2007).
102 Marc Kaufman, Merck Found Liable in Vioxx Case; Texas Jury Awards
Widow $253 Million, WASH. POST, August 20, 2005, at Al.
103 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 901.
104 Id. at 903.
105 One-third of drugs may not be indicated. David A. Hyman, Regulating
Managed Care: What's Wrong With A Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 221,
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errors might help eliminate the 77 million extra resulting prescrip-
tions 10 6 as well. Other studies have conversely found that where drugs
should have been provided in accordance with practice guidelines,
they were not, which resulted in lower utilization of drugs. 107 This
offers a counterargument to the drug companies' concern that they
might lose revenue as a result of PSO analyses.
IV. OTHER PLAYERS IN THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM ARE UNABLE TO PAY FOR PSOS
Pharmaceutical companies are not the only entities in the health
care system. The other components of the health care system ought
also to have an interest in reducing medical error. Patients are, in
theory, the focus of the health care system, and the PSO is meant to
effect changes that will benefit patients the most. Health care provid-
ers also might benefit from the use of PSOs in being able to reduce
medical error rates. In the era of managed care, where providers are
sometimes sharing some of the insurance risk with health insurers,
this would also benefit providers by being able to reduce costs. Given
the cost of medical error, health insurers would no doubt welcome a
reduction in medical error. The government clearly has an interest in
seeing medical error reduced, based on Congress's decision to pass
the Act in the first place. Employers who fund employee health insur-
ance plans have an interest in making sure that they, as employers, are
getting the best value for their insurance dollar and that their employ-
ees miss the fewest number of days from work due to their or their
loved ones' illnesses.
243 (2000). See also Arnold M. Epstein et al., Paying Physicians for High-Quality
Care, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 406, 407 (2004). In testimony before the Subcommittee
on Health, Michael R. Cohen, President of the Institute for Safe Medication Practices
stated that drug misuse costs the economy $177 billion each year and that estimated
patient deaths grew from 98,000 in 1995 to 218,000 in 2000. Hearing on Medicare
Reform: Laying the Groundwork for a Prescription Drug Benefit Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001) (state-
ment of Michael R. Cohen, President, Institute for Safe Medication Practices).
106 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 903.
107 David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay for: Result-
Based Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1486-88
(2001). Increased drug utilization might also decrease costs, as shown in a study of
the use of low molecular weight heparin for the treatment of deep venous thrombosis
at Henry Ford Health System. Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Qual-
ity: Case Studies and an Analysis, HEALTH AFF., Mar. - Apr. 2003, at 17, 20.
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A. Consumers Are in a Poor Position to Fund PSOs
Consumers are ill equipped to provide the funding for PSOs for
several reasons. First, not only are pharmaceutical costs ballooning,
health care costs skyrocketed in the last decade, and are continuing to
rise.10 8 The advent of managed care has done little to control the costs
of health care, and consumers, even those who have health insurance
through their employers, are being asked to bear an ever-growing por-
tion of the costs of their health care.' °9 As a result, more people are
choosing to go without health insurance, instead of bearing the larger
burden.' 10 This is evidenced by the fact that the number of uninsured
increased between 2001 and 2002 from 41.2 million to 44.6 million."'
Hand in hand with the increase in health care costs is the increase
in medically-related bankruptcies. A 1999 study showed that ap-
proximately 50 percent of the 10.7 million bankruptcies in the U.S.
were likely directly or indirectly attributable to health care costs.1
2
These results were despite the fact that some people declaring
bankruptcy had health insurance.1 3 That so many people could find
themselves in such dire straights as to resort to filing bankruptcy
speaks further to consumers' inability to fund PSOs. A more recent
study refutes the proposition that rising health care costs result in
more bankruptcies, arguing instead that the increased rate of filing
bankruptcy is "the result of an increasing propensity for American
households to file bankruptcy in response to economic problems."
'
"14
Regardless of which position is true, the fact remains that more people
are filing bankruptcies, declaring an inability to pay their debts.
115
Clearly these people are in no position to fund PSOs when they are
headed toward insolvency.
Second, consumers do not necessarily have access to the organi-
zations that perform data collection and analysis," l6 nor are consumers
108 Kelsey D. Patterson, Healing Health Care: Fixing a Broken System with
Information Technology, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 193, 195-96 (2004); Clark, supra
note 12, at 351.
109 See Elizabeth A. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film: The
Dissolving Critique, 37 J. HEALTH L. 267,285-87 (2004).
"0 Id. at 285.
'11 FURROW ET AL., supra note 24, at 495.
112 Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Fi-
nancing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 390-91
(2001).
"' Id. at 399-400.
114 Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy
Crisis, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1463, 1540 (2005).
115 id.
116 See Hyman & Silver, supra note 93, at 1452.
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in a position to contract with providers or seek certification from the
Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS). Since consumers
are a group of individuals that wield little power individually, they are
in no position to enter into the necessary arrangements to pay for
PSOs.117 Consumers are individuals, but they do not have groups that
organize them and provide representation for them as, for instance, the
American Association of Retired Persons does for senior citizens.
11 8
Moreover, what little negotiating power and/or influence they may
have had with respect to their health care has declined." 9 They have
also been absent from patient safety improvement efforts thus far.
20
That they have not been involved so far does not mean that they can
or should not be involved moving forward. A very strong argument
could be made that they absolutely should participate in ensuring
quality of health care, since it is the provision of their health care that
is affected.
It has been suggested that the funding for this sort of system could
be financed through tort awards.' 21 However, this might punish those
who are injured and result in awards that are larger than they other-
wise would have been, in order for the injured party to receive as
much compensation, as they would have had none of their award been
earmarked for funding patient safety analyses.
B. Providers Are Already Under Pressure to Control Costs
Providers are health care professionals such as nurses, doctors,
physical therapists, and physician assistants. They are, in some
respects, in a similar position to that of consumers. They, too, are
17 See Leatherman et al., supra note 107, at 28 ("[P]eople do not have the
option to pay for what they want, even if what they want is better than what they
have.")
118 However, organizations such as the American Cancer Society, American
Lung Association, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, and National Patient
Safety Foundation might be in a position to fund a PSO on behalf of patients. Phar-
maceutical companies would be, at least to some extent, funding PSOs through this
mechanism as well. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORT 2004:
CLEAR VISION, CONFIDENT FUTURE (2004) (Pfizer and Novartis are both listed as
having given at least $100,000 to the American Cancer Society).
119 Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient
Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16 (1998).
120 FARLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at 59.
12 1 Liang, supra note 9, at 567. Professor Liang argues that a strict liability
system of compensation should be applied to patients whose injuries are the results of
the medical delivery system, and these patients would receive some percentage of the
jury's award - perhaps one-half or three-quarters - and the remainder of the award
would go toward patient safety.
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feeling the pinch of managed care and that industry's efforts to rein in
costs,122 as evidenced by a lack of resources, financial or otherwise. 
z3
Providers are being faced with a variety of cost-cutting provisions,
including capitation, fee-sharing, and incentives to reduce the amount
of referrals or number of services they provide, even as health care
costs are predicted to continue to increase at a double-digit rate.
12 4
They are also faced with having to contract for lower reimbursement
from large managed care companies who have the power to bargain
for lower rates by virtue of their number of insured lives. In addition
to responding to the pressures of managed care, medical malpractice
premiums increased rapidly in the 1990s. 125 For instance, in Dade
County between 1999 and 2002, medical malpractice premium rates
increased, depending on the specialty looked at in the report, between
43 and 98 percent.
126
Individual physicians, particularly general practitioners, have little
incentive to pay for the services of a PSO and almost never compare
their performance and patient outcomes with others. 127 Not only are
individual physicians likely to have smaller incomes by virtue of their
smaller practice size and be ill-equipped to perform an analysis them-
selves, 128 any analysis of the problems ultimately identifies a problem
for which that physician is responsible. If he or she is the only physi-
cian in the office who oversees a staff of nurses, physician assistants,
phlebotomists, and physical therapists, it is his or her individual act
that is identified as the cause of the medical error. As the practice size
increases, there may be more utility in seeking analysis of practice
problems, but, again, the size of the practice may be too small to jus-
tify an expensive contract with a PSO to provide analysis of a small
set of data.
29
122 Financial survival is cited as the top strategic priority for health care pro-
viders by a Deloitte & Touche study. See Patterson, supra note 108, at 195. The de-
crease in reimbursement is also because of decreases in funding by state and federal
programs as well. Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Regulation of Patient Safety, 30
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375,411 (2005).
123 Devers et al., supra note 91, at 111.
124 Patterson, supra note 108, at 196.
125 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 9 (2003).
126 id.
127 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 940-41.
128 Hyman & Silver, supra note 107, at 1452.
129 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 961-62 ("[M]ost independent practices
are too small to afford ... technology.... Over and over again, one finds that provid-
ers fail to implement proven patient safety measure because they lack the incentive to
bear the cost.").
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Hospitals, as the largest providers in the health care food chain,
clearly have the greatest incentive to undertake these studies but little
to gain from doing so; 30 regardless, some likely will undertake them
in order to improve their processes. While some institutions are too
small or financially stressed to make these investments, 31 their doing
so may be justified through a "business case for quality."'3 2 Professors
Hyman and Silver define a business case for quality as "when a pro-
vider can earn a profitable financial return on a quality-enhancing
investment."'133 However, whether error reduction and improvement of
other quality measures will reduce costs and improve efficiency of
care is highly controversial.' 34 Additionally, they may have difficulty
in finding funding to establish this business case,135 even though the
absence of the business case may be the most important cause of poor
quality. 1
36
Physicians in larger organizations are more likely to report or be
willing to have their data reported and receptive to changes suggested
by an analysis because it reflects upon them less, personally, than
when reported as part of a large institution. Health care providers
working out of a hospital would likely be in a similar position, i.e.,
one in which reporting their data would not negatively impact them.
However, unless hospitals can justify the outlay of expense involved
in performing these analyses in-house or contracting them out to a
PSO by recognizing a corresponding savings, there is little incentive
for them to do SO. 13 7 The legislation itself provides no such incentive.
130 Mello et al., supra note 122, at 398.
31 Elise C. Becher & Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of Health
Care: Who Will Lead?, HEALTH AFF., Sept. -Oct. 2001, at 164, 174.
132 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 957-63. See also Becher & Chassin,
supra note 131, at 169.
133 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 957. See also Becher & Chassin, supra
note 131, at 169.4 Epstein et al., supra note 105, at 407.
135 However, even with support for these sorts of studies, hospitals may not
implement processes that will ultimately save them money. While it has been shown
that computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems reduce adverse drug events,
the investment in a CPOE may be difficult to justify under short-term cost pressures
and where the benefit occurs over a longer time period. See David F. Doolan & David
W. Bates, Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Hospitals: Mandates and
Incentives, HEALTH AFF., July - Aug. 2002, at 180. See generally Leatherman et al.,
supra note 107.
136 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 957-58.
137 See id. at 988 ("The Patient Safety Act is built on the false premise that
goodwill alone is sufficient to motivate health care providers to study their mistakes
and improve their systems.").
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Hospitals also have a disincentive to prevent medication errors
because injuries caused by medications add approximately forty-seven
hundred dollars to the cost of a hospitalization, 138 although some phy-
sicians believe that the problem of medical errors has been overesti-
mated. 139 Medical institutions also may not implement systems to
report their data because the patients feel the benefits directly, and the
institutions themselves do not. 140 However, some scholars argue that
spending more on patient safety initiatives now makes up for tradi-
tional underspending in this area.'
4
'
Regardless of whether providers choose to report their data, this
legislation makes it easier for them to do so without fear of reprisal.
Instead of having to worry about the information being reported as
discoverable 42 or providing a source of clients, 43 this law specifically
excludes reported information from discovery. 44 It can, however, be
obtained through the normal discovery process, i.e., as part of a single
patient's file and not as an entire data set. 14 Additionally, it has been
argued that if providers really do care about patient safety, they should
be paying for these sorts of analyses. 146 Indeed, some patient safety
data has been generated by hospitals on patient satisfaction surveys,' 47
but this is a far cry from independent statistical analysis of empirical
data provided by a hospital.
138 Becher & Chassin, supra note 131, at 174. Another study showed that
medication errors increased medical bills by six thousand dollars. See Clark, supra
note 12, at 351. This dichotomy was also noted in the Senate. 149 CONG. REC.
S16081, 16139 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) ("[Elvery adverse drug reaction [the hospital
network] avoids deprives it of the revenue from treating the case."). See also Devers
et al., supra note 91, at 111. The House also noted that medication errors result in
$3,500 to $4,000 in increased costs per incident, and that estimates of preventable
adverse drug events (ADEs) indicated that in 2000 there were 625,000 ADEs in hos-
pitals, costing $2.9 billion, and that medical errors cost the economy $38 billion each
year, of which $17 billion was the result of preventable errors. H.R. REP. No. 108-31,
pt. 1, at 9 (2003).
139 Devers et al., supra note 91, at 111.
140 See Patterson, supra note 108, at 206. See also Mello et al., supra note
122, at 396 ("[T]he costs of implementing safety improvement fall squarely on hospi-
tals."); Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 959.
141 Mello et al., supra note 122, at 402-03.
142 Liang, supra note 9, at 556-57. See also Devers et al., supra note 91, at
111-12.
143 Mello et al., supra note 122, at 389.
144 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41,
§ 922(a)(2), 119 Stat. 424,427 (2005).
141 Id. at § 922(c).
146 Liang, supra note 9, at 563.
147 Devers et al., supra note 91, at 110-11.
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C. Health Insurers Are Precluded by the Act from Funding PSOs
As mentioned before, health insurers are precluded from provid-
ing the funding for PSOs. 148 It is unclear from the legislative history
what the impetus for this section of the Act was. One might
hypothesize that Congress was concerned that allowing health insur-
ers, such as managed care organizations, to do so would have created
a conflict of interest.
If insurers provided funding to PSOs to perform analyses on pa-
tient safety work product, in theory, a temptation would be created to
use that data for their purposes to identify providers who cause more
errors and then preclude these providers from being able to provide
health care through their health plan, under the auspices of providing
better health care. However, even if a particular error can be traced
back to a particular physician it may not necessarily mean that physi-
cian was the actual cause of the error. Institutional errors are thought
to cause more injuries than individual errors. 149 Scapegoating a par-
ticular physician runs counter to the goal of anonymity that underlies
Section 922 of the Act.
A more cynical view of the clause precluding health insurers from
funding PSOs is that their lobby "convinced" Congress to add this
part of the Act to prevent cries from physicians and consumers to have
health insurers pay for these sorts of analyses, since it might be a natu-
ral function for them. However, there is nothing in the legislative
history to show this to be the case. Also, health insurers, as payers, are
more concerned with cost than benefit to the patient. 150 There is no
incentive for them to fund PSOs when doing so may result in
increased safety that might decrease their bottom line.
One way to get around the prohibition on health insurers funding
PSOs would be to incentivize its plan physicians to report their data to
and contract with PSOs. This. would enable providers to increase pa-
tient safety and participate in the voluntary reporting. Health insurers
could, theoretically, receive a benefit from providing this funding
through reduced outlays for medical errors caused by their providers
that were previously undiscovered. Indeed, some insurers have pro-
148 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act § 924(b)(1)(D).
149 Clark, supra note 12, at 350 (citing S.M. Dovey et al., A Preliminary Tax-
onomy of Medical Errors in Family Practice, 11 QUALrr & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE
233 (2002)). Clark notes that 82.6 percent of medical errors reported were caused by
health care systems' dysfunctions. It should be noted that this data might be skewed
because this data was gathered only from family physicians and because doctors
reporting errors might be more likely to report medical errors that are not the result of
their actions but that rather can be blamed on extrinsic factors.
150 Hyman & Silver, supra note 4, at 960.
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vided financial incentives to physicians for improving patient satisfac-
tion or quality of care. 151
D. Government Has Chosen not to Provide Funding for PSOs
The federal government would be a natural source of funding for
PSOs, at the very least to get the ball on reporting moving. Indeed, the
federal government does perform analyses on its own for the
programs it administers for the Veteran's Administration (VA).1 52
Congress could have made allowances for PSOs in the Act; instead, it
thrust this task upon the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHQR) 153 without increasing its budget for the coming year. 5 4 Al-
though its budget is small, $60 million of it earmarked was for patient
safety. 55 Part of this funding goes towards the Patient Safety Re-
search Coordinating Center, established to facilitate interactions
among patient safety grantees.156 However, many believe the agency
funding for patient safety is insufficient based on the estimated level
of the problem. 157 The $60 million falls short of the $100 million rec-
151 Epstein, supra note 105, at 406. This study also noted that, anecdotally,
the amount of money being used as an incentive is growing substantially. Id. Another
option might be to have data reported to accrediting organizations, such as the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Indeed,
JCAHO announced the day the law was signed that it "expects to create or become
part of a Patient Safety Organization under the auspices of its new International Cen-
ter for Patient Safety and seek federal approval under a new process to be created by
the Department of Health and Human Services." Press Release, Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Joint Commission Hails Enactment of
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (July 29, 2005) (on file with
author).
152 See Hyman, supra note 4, at 933-37.
153 The AHQR has been directed to be the central agency for patient safety
and reducing medical errors. Thomas R. McLean, Application of Administrative Law
to Health Care Reform: The Real Politik of Crossing the Quality Chasm, 16 J.L. &
HEALTH 65, 70 (2001-02). See also Patient Safety Improvement Corps, http://
www.ahrq.gov/about/psimpcorps.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
154 Funding for this agency remained static between the 2004 budget and 2005
budget proposal, at $318 million. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PERFORMANCE
BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, FISCAL YEAR 2006 FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY v, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/about/
cj2006/cj2006.pdf.
155 FARLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at 17. Interestingly, in this report it identi-
fied "major stakeholder groups" for a patient safety initiative; managed care organiza-
tions were not included, although patients, providers, patient safety organizations, and
the state and federal governments were. Id. at 4.
156 Id. at 6.
157 Id. at 11.
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ommended by the IOM report.' 58 Additionally, most of the funding
spent by the AHQR thus far has been focused on traditional peer re-
view journal articles. 159
Some have suggested that this sort of initiative should come from
the government under the direction of the National Institutes of
Health. 160 While the government does have other efforts in the area of
patient safety,' 6 1 it has not yet resolved to pay for the sort of analyses
this law requires, and the funding given to other federal agencies for
patient safety was minimal. 62 Other authors have noted that without a
commitment to substantial funding by the federal government for
health care information technology, identified by the IOM's report as
a key to reducing medical error, 163 there is unlikely to be substantial
change in the rate of medical errors.' 64
State governments could provide funding, but they too are facing
a health care crisis with costs escalating. 65 While some state govern-
ments have pursued initiatives, the number has been small and the
programs limited. 66 Since the federal government has appeared to opt
out of providing funding on its own outside of its VA programs, PSO
funding must come from either the state governments or the private
sector. Florida, for example, beginning in 2004, requires its Agency
158 Id. at 17.
151 Id. at 65-66.
160 Liang, supra note 9, at 561.
161 See, e.g., Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, Doing What
Counts for Patient Safety: Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and Their Im-
pact, http//www.quic.gov/hold/report/toc.htm. This task force is comprised of mem-
bers of the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor,
State, and Veterans Affairs, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Id.
162 FARLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at 11.
163 See generally To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1.
164 Patterson, supra note 108, at 207.
165 Press Release, Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization, State
Financial Crisis Leading to Transformation of Health Benefits (March 9, 2004),
available at http://www.hcfo.net/030904.htm.
166 See JILL ROSENTHAL & MAUREEN BOOTH, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POLICY, STATE PATIENT SAFETY CENTERS: A NEW APPROACH TO PROMOTE
PATIENT SAFETY (2004). This report looked at patient safety centers in six states that
are backed by state legislation. They noted, among other things, that the level and
reliability of funding is an issue in most states; fees, grants, and appropriations pro-
vide primary support for these patient safety centers. Id. at 13. Another conclusion of
this report was that "[s]tate patient safety centers would be logical models to serve as
PSOs." Id. at 28. Fewer than twenty states have adverse event reporting systems, but
most were in place before 2000. FARLEY ET AL., supra note 99, at 28. However, these
reporting systems are subject to the tight and shrinking state budgets. Id. at 29.
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for Health Care Administration to gather patient safety information
from its hospitals. 167 A number of states have also set up organizations
to study patient safety. 68 Other steps have been taken by state gov-
ernments to incentivize providers to invest in error reduction. 169 How-
ever, even if governments do decide to fund PSOs, it should be noted
that state medical boards have historically been incapable of monitor-
ing and ensuring quality. 70
E. Employers Lack Appropriate Incentives to Fund PSOs
As mentioned in Part IV(A) on consumers, employers are feeling
strapped to provide health insurance to their employees. Not only
have employers moved away from providing fee-for-service health
insurance' 71 and towards cost-controlling managed care health insur-
ance, 172 in recent years they have passed on increasing amounts of the
cost of health insurance to their employees.173 Employers have also
moved towards consumer-driven health care plans that force the em-
ployees to make decisions regarding their health care plan in an effort
to control the employer's costs. 174 Doing so, however, does not
address the problems of increasing costs of health care, uninsurance,
and underinsurance. 75 Based on this evidence, it is unlikely that an
employer would provide funding for a PSO to provide an analysis of
those providers that care for its employees. Moreover, there is little
incentive for an employer to pay for analyses of a provider when it is
unlikely that a provider would care for every one of its employees.
This disincentive might also apply to health care insurers as long as
employers are switching health care plans often. Employers would, in
167 Charlotte Crane, Better Medical Error Reporting Will Benefit All Con-
cerned, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Aug. 18, 2005, at 10C. In 2004, Florida established the
Florida Patient Safety Corporation, by enacting H.B. 1629, with the duties of "im-
prov[ing] the quality and safety of health care and reducefing] harm to patients" and
collecting, analyzing, and evaluating patient safety data. Agency for Health Care
Administration, Florida Patient Safety Corporation, http://ahca.myflorida.com/SCHS/
ppt/FPSCpresentation.ppt (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
168 Mello et al., supra note 122, at 385.
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, Bad Doctors Get a Free Ride, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2003, at A25 (noting that state medical boards have failed to discipline the
small minority of doctors who are responsible for multiple malpractice payouts).
171 Fee-for-service health insurance provided patients with virtually unlimited
access to medical resources, resulting in doctors administering unnecessary tests and
procedures. Pendo, supra note 109, at 277-78.
172 Id. at 277.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 291-92.
171 Id. at 292.
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effect, be subsidizing the increase in patient quality of care for other
patients, not their employees, of that provider, some of whom likely
would be covered under another employer's health care insurance.
Also, because it is unlikely that all their employees will see the same
provider, they could end up paying for analyses of a large number of
providers.
Employer groups offer more opportunity to affect health care
quality and cost. Employer groups, such as Leapfrog 76 and the Pacific
Business Group on Health, 77 may take the lead and fund PSOs. These
groups are collections of large employers that in recent years have
been pooling their health care dollars to force providers to increase
quality and provide better services to their employees. 178 They could,
in theory, fund these analyses up front and reduce their overall costs
by tying compensation to low-error or error-free services. 179 However,
there has been no evidence yet of their response to the Act in funding
PSOs, even though Leapfrog has initiated a voluntary, Web-based
hospital quality and safety survey.18
0
CONCLUSION
Pharmaceutical companies have taken too much from the Ameri-
can economy for far too little in return. The return on investment is
increasingly woeful. It is time for large drug companies to put their
marketing dollars forth as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of patient
safety. They can find other ways to peddle drugs; no doubt they will
find ways to increase cost effectiveness to make up for the marketing
budget lost by funding PSOs.
Other players in the consumption and delivery of health care are
unable to fund PSOs based on their position or the applicable law. Of
the members of the health care industry, only pharmaceutical compa-
nies are in a position fund PSOs. Since the government has, at this
176 The Leapfrog Group is a group of 170 companies and organizations that
buy health care and who look to reduce medical error and encourage public reporting
of health care quality. See The Leapfrog Group Fact Sheet, http://www.leapfrog
group.org/aboutusleapfrog-factsheet (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
177 The PBCH is a business coalition of 50 purchasers, including Bank of
America, Cisco Systems, FedEx, DirectTV, Lowe's, Pacific Gas & Electric Com-
pany, Stanford University, Verizon Communications, and Wells Fargo & Company,
who, to be eligible for membership, must have at least 2,000 benefits-eligible covered
lives, and who seek solutions to the health care issues facing purchasers. See Pacific
Business Group on Health, http://www.pbgh.org (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
178 See Hyman & Silver, supra note 107, at 1472-73.
179 See id. at 1480. See also Mello, supra note 122, at 415.
180 Robert S. Galvin et al., Has the Leapfrog Group Had an Impact on the
Health Care Market?, HEALTH AFt:., Jan. - Feb. 2005, at 228, 229.
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time, decided not to undertake this venture, the mantle of funding
PSOs has fallen to the private industry. Not only do big drug compa-
nies have the resources to do so, but they also have the personnel
and/or contacts within the industry who have the specialized skills
required in order to accomplish the analyses required to generate
meaningful and useful data.
While this proposal is not a panacea to solving the problem of im-
proving patient safety and who pays for it, it is at least a small start
that can help guide and shape future, perhaps larger, efforts. This law
is too new for there to be any way to judge efforts already underway
under its auspices. Perhaps time will show that providers are more
willing than previously thought to pay for these studies; perhaps em-
ployers will find a way to justify expenditures in this field; or perhaps
consumers and patients will band together to speak with a loud
enough voice in protest of the magnitude of medical injury such that
their legislative or elected representatives will finally step in and do
something besides enact underfunded legislation. It remains to be seen
what the impact of this law will be. As it stands now, with no funding
to perform needed analysis, there is little chance that it will succeed
without private industry stepping forward and paying the bill.

